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Jahar Sen 
On the basis of some references in Mulasarvastivada Vinaya-
samgraha1 and Kautilya's Arthashastra2 Bal Chandra Sharma, a reputed 
historian of Nepal, has held that the beginning of India's commercial 
relation with Nepal and Tibet can be pushed back as early as fifth century 
B.C.] Chang K'ien, the Chinese general and explorer of Central Asia 
in the second century B.C., testified thatthelewasa trade between North-
eastern India and South-western China in Chinese silk cloth and Chinese 
bamboo flutes, among other things. These were brought into Eastern 
India and were carried through the entire length of North India to as far 
west as Mghanistan and Central Asia. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee states 
that Indo-Mongoloids were the intermediaries in this trade.4 It may 
be conjectured that these Indo-Mongoloids included both the people 
of India and Nepal. From the acc0unts of Yuan Chwang, the Tang 
annals and other sources, continuous flow of commerce in the overland 
trade route from Bihar to Tibet and China through Nepal has also been 
conjectured.s 
In 1583 Ralph Fitch noticed the trade between Bengal, Nepal 
Bhutan and Tibet and the caravan of merchants coming from China, 
Tataryand Persia.6 The detailed description of an interesting ledger of 
an Armenian merchant na:rrt(.d Hovhannes Joughayetsi gives a pen picture 
of the commercial link between India, Nepal and Tibet in the closing 
decades of the seventeenth centt:.ry.7 The narration of Father Della 
PennaB and Father Ippolito Desideri9 in the early eighteenth century 
also confirmed that intelcourse between India and Tibet via Nepal was 
free and unrestricted. Flourishing trade was carried on between India 
and Tibet through the passes of Nepal. The Kashmiri merchants carried 
their goods by Ladakh to the Kuti passes to procure wool from there. 
From this point, their manufactured goods were sent partly to Ti'bet, 
partly to China by Sining and partly to Patna through Nepal. The 
Tibetan merchants brought woollen cloths, ponies, shawl goats, yaks, 
sheep, musk, salt, borax gold~ silver and paper to Kathmandu. The 
Lamas of Tibet also sent much bullion to the Nepal mints. The Indian 
merchants carried cotton cloth, cutlery, glassware, coral, pearls, spices, 
~amphor, betel and hardware. These were sent to Tibet through the 
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passes of Nepal.lo George Bogle in his letter dated 20 August 1174-
written from Tassisudon informed Warren Hastings that the trade bet-
ween India and Tibet was "carried on by the way of Patna and Nepal 
thr.:mgh the means ofMoghuls and Kashmiris ... "11 Subsequently in his 
report on the' 'Trade of Tibet" he further stated that the merchants of 
Kashmir "like Jews in Europe or Armenians in the Turkish empire" 
scattered themselves over the Eastern Kingdoms of Asia and carried on 
extensive trade between its distant parts. They disposed of their 
commodities in Tibet or forwarded to their associates in Sining, a town 
on the Chinese border.12 The commodities of Bengal were also con-
veyed to Tibet through Morung'3 and Sikkim. The Gossains' 4 after 
their expulsion from Nepal usually frequented this route. Besides these, 
another road leading from Benares and Mirzapur passed through Mustang. 
The more valuable sorts of Bengal goods were sometimes exported into 
Tibet by this route. '11 Thus it is evident that the trade between India 
and Central Asia was carried on freely before the ascendancy of the 
Gurkhas in Nepal in 1769.'6 Since then, the trade sharply declined. 
The East India Company. however, was intensely eager to revive 
this trade. The Kinloch expedition (1767)'7 and the Logan Mission 
(1769)'8 were despatched to Nepal With this end in view. B 19le in 
l>is general reports to W .rren Hastings on his return from Tibet e n-
phatically pOinted out, "1 he opening of the road through Nepal and 
obtaining the abolition of the duties and exactions which hav~ lately 
been impcsed on trade in that country appears an object of great impor-
tance towards estabHshing a free communication between Bengal an1 
Tibet."'9 Samuel Turner, the leader of the Second Trade Mission to 
Tibet in 1 783, recommended the use of Kathmandu - Kuti route for this 
purpose. In 1779 Tashi Lama also wrote to the King of Nepal to open 
its trade-routes to encourage unrestricted traffic between India and Tibet. 
The Missions of Captain Kirkpatrick (1793)20 and Maulavi Abdul Kadh' 
(1795)21 and the instructions to Captain Knox,22 the first British Resi-
dent in Nepal (1801), amply bear out how deeply anxious the Government 
of India was to gamer all possible data on the basis of which it could 
formulate it~; commercial policy towards Nepal and the adjoining areas 
of Central Asia. Brian Houghton Hodgson, the Resident in Nepal 
(Actg. Resident I 8 29-3 I; Resident I 833 -43) had a fond dream" to 
convert Nepal from an interposing obstacle into a common mart whe1e 
the merchants of Hindusthan might interchange their commodities 
with the traders of Inner Asia."23 The competition for Central Asian 
Commerce, according to him,lay between the trade-route from Peking,. 
to St. Petersburg on the north and that from Peking to India via the Nepal' 
passes on the south. He advocated the expansion of the trade through 
the southern route. 24 As regards the potentiality of trade with Tibet 
through Nepal he categorically stated,". . . . . . .. Tibet may well be 
believed capable of maintaining a large and valuable exchange of, com-
modities with Great Britain, through the medium of our Indian subject') 
and the people of NepaL ....... "25 With striking details and com-
parative analysis Hodgson pointed out that a Central Asian trade through 
Nepal wa!> "capable of an easy, immediate and considerable extension."26 
. So he urged, "Let the native merchants of Calcutta and Nepal, separately 
and in concert take up this commerce."27 
II 
After the conclusion of the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1861, 
the attention of the Government of India was focussed on Sikkim as the 
main channel to carry out its Central Asian pelicy. A systematic attem/pt 
was made in 1864 to assess the volume and nature of trade with Sikkim, 
Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal for four years from J 860 to J 863.28 . The 
Bengal Government recommended that the East Bengal Railway Company 
should be allowed to extend their line from Kustia to the Teesta Valley. 
"Should this proposition be carried out there is no doubt of a very 
extensiYe and important trade springing up, especially with Tibet~d 
Nepal. "29 In 186l, the Superintendent of Darjeeling suggested that 
a road through Sikkim to Tibet should be constructed to facilitate the 
establishment of an' annualfair at Goke near Darjeeling.30 In October 
1869 Colonel Haughton, the Commissioner of Cooch Behar strongly 
urged the cultivation of friendship with the Lamas of Tibet.31 In 
July 1870 he submitted a report on the subject of extension of trade 
with Tibet and China and suggested that first, the Government of China 
should be ask~d to remove all restrictions on th~ free pass<)ge of merchants 
and travellers and secondly the Rajah of Sikkim should be requested to 
procure from Tibet authentic information as to the duties on the imports 
and prohibition, if any, of the importation of any particular articles. 
The Governhlent of India· sanctioned thes(f proposals. 32 In January 
187 I, the British Minister at Peking communicated that there was no 
possibility of obtaining through the Government of China the means of 
extending trade with Tibet. The Secretary of State, however, assured the 
Government of India that the questi<m of opening trade route between 
Tibet arid India would· be raised in a future negotiation of a new treaty 
with China.33 
In a separate report, Haughton enumerated the follOWing routes 
through which the 'markets of Central Asia could be approached from 
India: (I) via Ladakh (2) via Nepal (3) via Darjeeling (4) via Buxa 
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and Western Dooars (s) via Assam and Towang (6) via Bhamo and Burma. 
The route mcst used was that through Assam and Towang. Haughton 
induced some Patna businessmen, who used the Nepal route, to establish 
an agency at Darjeeling. Like many others he too overestimated the 
potentiality of Darjeeling route and expected that by this measure 
the traffic of the Nepal route would be diverted to Darjeeling. This 
might cause, he apprehended, the jealousy of the Darbar at Kathmandu. 
The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who later paid a visit of Darjeeling, 
maintained, however, that the Darbar would not view the extension of 
trade along the Darjeeling route with jealousy.s4 
In the next year, the Government of Bengal submitted that 
"the Sikkim routes should be examined, since even if the trade were 
not thrown open to us directly any radical improvement of the road 
must lead to a considerable increase of indirect traffic, and perhaps by 
bringing the Tibetans down to the plains pave the way for a more liberal 
policy in the future." J5 
On 2 S April 1873 a deputation from the Society of Arts in 
England called on Duke of Argyle, the Secretary of State, and submitted 
a Memorial. The Memorial suggested inter alia the development of routes 
through Nepal and Bhutan, improvement of these in Sikkim by extending 
roads to the Tibetan frontier and completion of the railway connection 
between Darjeeling and Calcutta for promoting commerce between 
India and the trans-Himalayan countries. The Secretary of State and 
the Government of India also "repeatedly expressed the great interest 
which they take in the subject of trade with Tibet and Central Asia." SII 
In the cold season· of 1873-74 Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner 
of Darjeeling was deputed to visit Sikkim and the Tibetan frontier. He 
was instructed to enquire into the prospects of trade with Tibet and of 
the advisability of a road through Sikkim to the Tibetan frontier. He 
made three specific suggestions. First, the Government of India should 
attempt to obtain from the Government of China a declaration that the 
latter was not opposed to free intercourse between Tibet and India. 
Secondly, it should express strong remonstrance against the exclusion 
of Indian tea from Tibet. Thirdly, a road with good bridges should be 
consb ucted from Teesta Valley to the Jelep pass.37 In this despatch 
NO.32 of 8 April 1874 Earl of Derby, the Secretary of State, declared 
that from an imperial point of view much importance should be attached 
to the revival of trade between India and Tibet. T.F. Wade, the British 
Minister at Peking, with this end in view suggested the despatch of 
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"a mixed official and conunercial mission ..•..... without reference 
to the Court of Peking .......... "38 It transpired that the opposition 
of the Central Government of China to commercial intercourse with 
the foreigners was based on some general grounds. But th~ Govemment 
of Ssu-Chuen, the province co-terminus with Tibet, was particularly 
opposed to the opening of Tibet for trade with India.39 
III 
Thus from 1861 the Govemment ofIndia was seriously occupied 
with the problems connected with the opening of Tibet through Sikkim. 
The trade through Nepal, during these years, did not receive as much 
importance as it had in the last three decades of the eighteenth ecntury 
and the first three decades of the nineteenth century. True it is that 
on a few occasions, some important· offiCials both .n London and Simla 
were highly stirred up with the expectation of exploring the immense 
potentiality of the Central Asian trade via NepaL But, on the other 
hand, the men on the spot, namely, the local officers of the districts 
bordering on Nepal as well as the British Resident at Kathxnandu were 
reluctant to share their optimism. To illustrate this point, a report 
of C. E. R. Girdlestone, the British Resident at Kathmandu (1812-88), 
is discussed below. 40 
The factors that impeded the trade with Central Asia via Nepal 
can be divided into two parts:- the rigid facts of geography (Girdlestone 
used the expression, "the circumstances of any given country") and the 
variable facts of politics. In the first category xnay be included the 
difficulties of overland transport, simple habits of the people, inclemency 
of the weather during the greater part of the year and ruggedness of some 
of the passes. As to the difficult nature of the route to Tibet, Girdlestone 
pointed out," ...... the passes from the Teraie to Nipal and thence to 
Tibet are lower than those of Cashmere, Lahoul, and the Karakorum, 
but they are so severe that men, not animals, are necessarily the carriers 
of burdens." It was possible to xnake easier routes along the course of 
rivers both in Nepal and in the neighbourhood of Tibet, "but in such 
case again there would be question of expense before a practical path 
could be laid out." 
• In Tibet, the towns were few and far between. These had 
limited population. The villages were not numerous. The buildings 
with the exception of monasteries did not convey the idea of an affluent 
society. The Tibetans did not lack warm clothing. These were sold 
in Kathmandu at a much cheaper rate. The woollen stuffs found 
customers among the small minority of the upper classes. In the climate 
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of Tibet cotton cloth alone WaS' not sufficient. So the Manchester goods 
were not in demand. "An exception perhaps might be made in favour 
of Himalayan tea, but in such case it would not be a new demand which 
would be effected, but merely a change of market." 
In the category of the variable facts of politics may be included 
the climate of tension generated by the unhappy relations between Nepal 
and Tibet. The trade in European merchandize was carried on by the 
Newal's. The number of their shops at Lhasa did not exceed thirty-two. 
In the important towns of Tibet, their business transaction was confined 
to interchange of only country produce. Inspite of the Nepal-Tibet 
treaty of 185"6 particular items of trade were at times viewed with disfavour. 
In I 873 a consignment of opium, in which the Nepal Darbar was interested, 
valued at Rs. 50,000 was stopped at the border by the Tibetans. The 
Newar traders also were subjected to personal violence and exactions 
and were not free from risk to life and property. Even temporary 
additions to the number of personal servants and guards of the Nepalese 
envoys was jealously watched by the Lamas and made the ground of 
formal remonstrance. The Darbar was unable to prevent all these. 
The Society for the encouragement of arts, manufactures and 
commerce cherished an opinion that "it is essential that the Indian 
Government shall use every effort to obtain from Nepal free passage 
f'Jr merchants and goods to the Thibetan frontier in return for the full 
and free access enjoyed by Nipal to our territories." In reply to this 
contention, Girdlestone advanced the folIc wing arguments. 
First, though Nepal had full and free access. to India, she had 
to purchase its European imports subject to imperial duties. 
Secondly, if by "free passage" the Society meant the abolition 
of intermediate duties in Nepal, it was asking for greater concession 
than that which Nepal enjoyed. 
, 
Thirdly, in 1859 the Governor General of India declared that 
the Government of India a~sumed no right to interfere with or to advise 
. upon the commercial policy of Nepal. 
Fourthly, the utmost that could be expected in modification 
of this declarfltion is that the Nepalese Government might forego the 
levy of the additional duties on imports from Kathmandu to the Tibetan 
border' 'in the hope. that if trade increased it would be recouped by the 
increase in the customs receipts on the southern portion of the route". 
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Girldlestone firmly asserted, "But I have no hope that it would 
consent to abandon its claims to duties upto Kathmandu on goods intended 
fof Thibet .... " He further argued, "The information at my command 
gives no ground for surmising that if the British Government made 
overtures for the improvement of trade they would be received favourably, 
or that if commercial relations were established there would be any 
more security for the comfort and prosperity of British subjects than 
there is now for Newars." "I know no reason why", he said, "unless 
Sir Jung Bahadoor' s extreme remedy of breaking d,own their exclusiveness 
by force of.arms be adopted, free trade should b~ established in Thibet, 
and .were it established there would, in my opinion, be no great benefit 
to European firms beca.sue their goods would be too expensive for the 
bulk of the population." . 
The Government ofIndia, on perusal of the report of Girdlestone 
came to the conclusion tl.lat the value of the trade with Tibet was over-
estimated and the difficulties, both physical and political, that impeded 
its devel0pment were under-estimated. The G )vernment also did 
not consider it desirable, so long as the Chinese-refused to allow commer-
cial intercourse wIth Tibet, to incur expenditure in constructing roads 
through Sikkim, as suggested by the Government of Bengal. Despatch 
of a mixed official and commercial mission to Tibet without reference 
to the Court of Peking, as suggested by the British Minister there, was 
also considel ed inexpedient. 41 
In 1879, the Secretary of State conveyed that the trade with 
Nepal and Tibet was of a "very small dimension" , asserted that it wa!> 
"capable of comiderable development" and pressed for the considera-
tion of any steps for the furtherance of this trade. The tariff policy 
and other restrictive measures of the Darbar, it was said, hampered 
the development of this trade.4 :! Both the Resident at Nepal and the 
Government of Bengal had appraised two years ago that the trade was 
not capable of c0nsiderable development and in so far as the traifi' was 
.:oncemed, th ~ sins of the Darbar hl.d much been exaggerated ,43 The 
Government of the North Western Provinces and Oudh also had mainta-
ined that there was "very littJe room for a larger trade than now exists." 
44 Girdlestone, in reply to the despatch of the Secretary of State, 
reiterated that the trade with Tibet must always be insigificant on 
account of the long and tiresome journey along the land route and also 
due to sparse population of Tibet. He too advocated the use of Sikkim 
route as it had "fewest physical difficulties" and "shorter" and better 
communication with a sea port (Calcutta) than the routes starting from 
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North-West Provinces." As to the trade via Nepal, he reported, 
"There is nothing to be gained in promoting trade through Nepal, not 
only the roads are so bad, but because We cannot hope, with our pres~nt 
understanding, to get a surrender of the transit duties which are_ an 
additional restriction on it. "45 
The Government of the North-West Provinces and Oudh, too, 
again reported that there was little hope of any immediate development 
of trade.46 This conc.lusion was based on the data furnished by the 
district officers of Kumaun, Bareilly, Kheri, Bahraich, Gonda, Basti 
and Goruckpore. The district officer of Dehra Dun expressed "great 
doubt" whether, even suppos\ng a great road was completed through 
the Nilang pass to enable ponies etc. to pass and duttes levied by the 
Rajah of Tehri removed, the trade with Tibet would increase to any 
great extent.47 
Discordant views were expressed at various levels and on 
diffierent occasions regarding the potentiality of trade betwetn India, 
Nepal and Tibet. So, it was thought desirable to have some common 
opinions as to the means of improving this traffic. Girdlestone proposed 
to E. Buck, Director, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, North 
Western Provinces and Oudh that there should be a conference to discuss 
this subject. The Bengal Government declined to be represented at 
such conference, which, it thought, would not be of much practical 
good.48 The Government of North Western Provinces and Oudh 
also argued that such conference would be of no avail.49 Buck agreed 
to be present at Fyzabad on 25 January 1880. Apart from Girdlestone and 
Buck, the following officers were present in the conference :-R. 
Speeding, Collector, Gorakhpur; R. De Montmorency, Deputy Commiss-
ioner, Bahraich; J. Woodburn, Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad; J. 
Hooper, Assistant Commissioner, Gonda; E. Wood, Conservator, Oudh 
Forests and D. Pitcher, Assistant Commissioner, Lucknow. One of 
of the main questions considered here was the effect of Nepalese transit 
duties on the through trade to Tibet. 
The Fy'zabad conference came to the conclusion that through 
traffic to Tibet on a large scale was neither probable nor practicable 
under existing circumstances. The Resident submitted in this conference 
that there was no practicable trade route through Nepal to Tibet from 
the North-Westtern Provinces. Even if it was possible to develop such 
a route, it would strike a part of Tibet "too sparsely populated to be 
of any value from a commercial point of . view.' 'so The question of 
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Tibetan trade was considered with reference to Kumaun as well. Within 
last two or three years, no imports of any importance had been brought 
to Kumaun except salt and a little gold. Borax trade had also failed. 
The part of Tibet which lay above KumaWl could not supply wool in 
sufficient quantities. 
The potential~ty of tea trade was also discussed with special 
emphasis. The proceedings of the conference laid down, "The question 
of supplying Indian tea for Central Asia was one which should at no time 
be neglected, and all means should be taken to afford it every possible 
opening. "5f The Resident undertook to procure samples of the tea 
in use in Eastern Tibet "with a view to ascertaining the practicability 
of manufacturing similar quantities in Kumaun" . 
On 13 July I 880 some of the important findings of the Fyzabad 
Conference were communicated to the Secretary of State by the Govern-
nent of India.52 This communication was conveyed in reply to the 
despatch of the former No. 13 (Statistics and Commerce) dated 13 
January, 1879. Though this despatch enquired of the speific condition 
of Nepal trade, it contained implicit suggestions on the problem of the 
development of Tibetan trade also. In fact, the Fyzabad Conference 
took due notice of it and laid down some ccnclusions discussed above. 
The reply of the Government of India to the Secretary of State referred 
to many of the decisions of this Conference along with its own opmIOn 
but It omItted to mention a single word on the question of Central 
Asian tradf! via Nepal. Thh omission is significant. It is quite likely 
that the Government ofIndia too at this stage did not seriously take into 
consideration the feasibility of the Tibetan trade via Nepal. 
The question of supplying Indian tea for Central Asia was stressed 
by the Fyzabad conference. According to the decision of the conference 
the Resident on 12 July 1880 asked for specimens of the tea in general 
demand in the provinces ofU, Tsang and Kham "with a view of enabling 
the tea-gardens in British India to manufacture tea in accordance with 
the taste of the Thibetans."53 The Darbar informed the Resident 
that the samples of tea had been called for from Lhasa.54 The Report 
of the Director of Agriculture and Commerce on the foreign trade of 
the North West Provinces and Oudh for 188 1-82 noticed the total 
exclusion ofIndian tea from the Nepalese market. "In order to retain 
the profits they derive from the article of consumption within their own 
territories," the Director pointed out, "the Chinese have directly 
forbidden the export of Indian tea into Thibet and succeeded by their 
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iafluence in excluding it· from Nipal."55 The Resident reporred·;that 
the tea generally was not considered, as a good business by the Nepalese 
tr;lders.' The foreign traders at Kathmandu were only allowed to deal 
in certain specified articles.· Tea was not included in the license of 
anyone of these. He also referred to "the obstacles which the Chinese 
jea'lousy would interpose" to frmtrate any attempt to introduce tea 
thnmgh Nepal into Tibet.56 He did not think that there was a big 
opening for tea in or through Nepal. 
The report 0 f the external land trade cf Bengal for 1881-82 
mentioned that brick. tea of Tibet was always available for purchase in 
Darjeeling being brought all the way from the Chinese frontier. The 
Hnance D?P'll tmc'nt of the Government of India also guessed that the 
imports from Nepal though classified in the trade returns as "India" 
tea was really Chinese brick tea.57 These disturbing findings -prompted 
the Government of the North West Provinces and Oudh to urge that 
"something should be done to relax the total exclusion of tea from the 
Nepalese market. "58 The Government of India, however, did not 
consider" the present suitable time for addressing the Nepalese Govern-
ment on the subject. "59 Thus a very small plan aiming at the markets 
of Central Asia fell through. 
IV 
A small step failed. The proposal for a big lec.p was in the 
offing. A bunch of documents procured from the Nt:pal Resid<:ncy 
and noW in the possession of National Archives of ILdia, t\ew Celb 
throw much light on this big leap. 60 
On June 25, 1889 F. Prestage, the Chairman ofthe Darjeeling 
Him.alayan Railway Company, informed the Resident that the Directors 
of the said Company were seriously thinking of rriaking proposals to 
the Nepal Governmei1t to extend the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway 
from about two and a half miles down the line from the t .rmmus along 
the Ghoom ridge to Manibhanj;m, or the' base of Piontal1ka Tamarangor 
to Dhankate the confluence of Kosi and Arun on the east end of the 
Kathmandu Valley about 82 miles in length. In brief, the said line 
would ultimately be extended along the Singa]ila Range to the most 
suitable point to take off from. the east end o( the Kathmandu Valley. 
The said point was about three miles west of Tongloo. . 
In a further communication dated 1 October 1888, PreHage 
expressed his amlOyance to the Resident that the Government of India 
were "very much adrift in trying to open a trade-route with Lhasa 
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at the point Of bayonet by the Jekp La," ~ 'We should avoid tf:c capital 
of Dalai Lama" , he suggested, "and strike through Nepal to the pastures 
to the north-west of the Arun Valley" . 
. Prestage contended that Lhasa itself was not a 'place of trade. 
It Yvas "it, stronghold of the most obstructive ecclesiastic, in crcati{L " 
They were, in p:)s3cssion ef the districts between Lhasa and the North 
East Frontier of India along theJelep La route. This route could be op-
ened up and maintained "at the point of bayonet" only, but" every shot 
fired by us" argued Prestage, "tends to retard rather than advancc 
direct and free t,'ade with them", Moreover, Lhasa was "as much under 
the influence of PekLl as ever." The armed resistance bv the Tibetans 
•. , J 
against the British advance by thc' Jelep La made it clear that the British 
were not welcome bv that route. Eyen the Bhutanese were givina 
• . J' b 
"mo re than friendly aid" to the invading Tibetans. They vvere detennined 
not to have their highways disturbed. 
The distance of' 'Tingri Maidan" (the centre of the pasture and 
wool producing areas in Tibet) was only 262 miles from the tenninus or 
Darjecling Hi,m.hyan Railway at Darjeeling via Tamakote (the proposed 
terminus of the Nepal extension of the Darjeeling HimalaY<'J1 Railway) 
and only 180 miles from Tamakote with almost a continuous d(;scenciing 
lead by the A)"Un Valley from 1 2,500 to 2,900 ft. On the other hand, 
the distance from Tingri Maidan via Lhasa "vas 77o;-niles. The footways 
meander through Tibet and for the greater part of the distance are very 
high from the basement of the mountains. In Sikkim, too, there are 
continuous ascents and descents. Compared to these, the proposed 
railway promised some distinct advantages. 
The importance of this Arun Valley route can hardly be overesti-
mated. The most valuable trade was conducted through the Chinese 
Tartary and Tibet up and down the Arun Valley-"then via Dingri the 
road serving North West Tibet and the plateaus and pastures to the 
west of ShirgatLee. By this road most valuable fleeces came from the 
west of Shirgatzee and towards Cashmele." In fact, the direct route 
from the Central and Western Province of Tibet (the largest and best 
wool prodUcing areas) to India passed through Nepal by the Arun Valley 
'route. 
Prestage suggested also that in the first instance a bridle truk 
be made across the frontier into .Nepal, by l1am or by the best route 
into the Tambur Valley to Dhankota, an important market at the. ~onflu(:'nce 
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of San Kosi, Arunand Tamburriversand the Arun Valleyand Kathmandu 
roads. From this point the valuable products of the Kathmandu and 
Arun Valleys, Tibet and countries beyond that would be drawn and a 
very heavy and growing traffic would be secured. 
He was convinced that the proposed railway extension would 
surely bestow a miscellany of advantages to both Nepal and India. In 
his reports dated, Darjeeling 14. August, 1888; dated, London, 14 August, 
1889and 2 Julp889 heenlisted the gains to both the countries which 
are culled below:--
Gains to Nepal. 
I. Nepal would receive all the benefits of cheaper and quicker 
transport that a railway could offer. 
2. In case of famine or scarcity, the Railway would directly 
pour into Nepal Valley the surplus foodgrains from the Rangpur and 
Dinajpore districts and other districts of North Bengal at cheap rates. 
3. It would lead out the surplus produce to the nearest markets 
and lead in imports of all kinds. This would surely augment the produc-
tive capacity, comfort and prosperity of the people. 
4. Almost all the hi1l slopes traversed by the proposed railway 
would be converted into highly productive tea gardens at the most 
suitable elevations 3000 feet to 5000 feet. It was estimated that the 
value of the land would be increased more than hundred fold. Assum-
ing that only five miles on each side of the line were brought under 
cultivation, it would bring a permanent increase of revenue to the state 
of the large sum of RS.3,60,ooo per annum. 
5. The railway would specially serve the rich fertile valley 
of the Myong and the highly cultivated valley of the Timbour. This 
would increase the prospect of permanent revenues of the state. 
6. By the extension and the improved approach to the terminus 
of the Arun Valley, the very growing trade with Tibe t would be permanent-
ly secured to Nepal. . Moreover, a large and very growing trade in wool 
would add much to the prosperity of all the Trans-Himalayan states 
concerned with its transit. 
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7. The surplus labour in Nepal could be absorbed in profitable 
employments in construction, maintenance and working of the railway 
and also in the transport of heavy traffic which was likely tc increase. 
8. The railway works would further develop the already great 
capacity of the Nepalese people to as useful artificers and reliable workmen 
and enable them to command better pay. 
9. "Chil" could be planted in the vacant suitable slopes along 
the railway at about 6,000 ft. altitude. This would ~ive excellent 
charcoal for working the proposed railway, the D.H. Railway and 
also for drying tea in the Darjeeling district. This would develop 
into a growing important permanent source of revenue. 
10. Cheer pine (the eastern chi!) on the Myong ridges was abundant. 
The hill was also profusely clothed with oaks and other trees. So, 
the charcoal and wood would be available forthwith midway along the 
extension line. 
Gains to India and England. 
I. The gradients of the slopes of the Myong Valley would be 
easy to traverse on account of the availability of ample fuel mid-way 
on the line. So, the cost of hauling ofthe D.H. Railway would be low 
and the rates should also be so. 
2. The cost of ~ransport from the wool pastures of Tibet (I 3°00 ft) 
to the proposed Terminus of the railway (3000 ft)would be only 
one-third of that by the Lhasa and Sikkim routes. 
3. The total cost of laying down the wool in Calcutta by the 
Arun Valley route would surely assure good profit to all concerned. 
4. The Government of India would be saved the enormous cost 
of improving the most unkind trade-route via Lhasa. Continuous and 
costly political complications might also thus be avoided. 
s.· The Nepalese people are most capable, intelligent and kindly. 
It would be a pleasure to be associated with them through this venture. 
6. The expansion of trade between Ghoom station and Nepal 
was most encouraging. The increase of traffic in 6 years was shown to 
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be 40 per cent. 'h was cheering to note the pt~rcept1bk increase of 
traffic on all roads leading to the frontier. 
7. From Nepal, the Government ofIndia would be able to recruit 
the Gurkha soldiers and also to. draw the skilled and intelligent labour 
required mOl'e· particularly for working railways in the plains. 
8. It would not be necessary to keep troops at the distant outpost 
,It Gnatong. 
9. Calcutta in particular would benefit from the increase of 
valuable exports, particularly wool. 
10. Suh ject to the stiplllations of contract, the Darbar would be 
persuaded to grant, free cf cost, the use of the ,,,'aste lapd upon which 
the line ,,;,ould be constructed, to permit to fell useless timber en route 
within an area to .be agreed to and also to allow the exclusive right to 
all timber grown on useless and denuded areas within an agreed distance 
from the railway. The gain thus accrued would be immense. First 
class tim her for railway construction and maintenance PU1'poses would 
be available at moderate cost. Match making and many other industries 
would be ~tarted. Tea-chests wo~ld no longer be iInported from 
Japan, even into the Darjeeling district. All these would tend to keep 
money in the country and stiffen exchange. 
II. The companies like "Bradford" and' 'Saltaire" of England 
would get much the superior staple wool. This w.(')uld give them 
advantages over continental manufactures. 61 
The Secretary to the Government of India in a letter dated 20 
September, 1889 informed Prestage that the Government of India had 
no objection to his making any exploration in Nepal. He was instructed 
to obtain the sanction of the Darbar and was asked to take no active 
steps without first consulting the British Resident. 
The Resident informed Prestage on 9 October, ,I 889 that the 
proposal for an extension of the D.H. railway into Nepal "was laid 
before the Darbar but was met by a distinct refusal to entertain even 
a preliminary survey." 
Prestage was informed by the resident on 1 March, 1890 
that no concession from the Darbar could be expec~ed "till some radical 
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change in their 'Exclusive' policy ismadc." On 4- Noveitl~er, 1892, 
the Secretary to the Government of Nepd informed him" the Darbar's 
inability to' comply with your proposal for tte construction of the 
'Railway into this country." Thus the idea of a big leap to reach the 
heart cf Central Asia ended in fiasco. 
Towards the close of the nineteenth c~ntury, the doubtful lure 
of the Tihetan market gave way to other "Imperial exigencies." (an 
expression used by Brodrick C!1 a later occasion). The enchanting land 
of snow remained' 'the modern Brynhilde, asleep on her mountain top" 6~ 
and British Siegfried failed to awaken her in thc nineteenth century. 
The keynote of the British policy towards Central Asia during this period 
may be stated in thc following words: "Wc, on thc other hand, can 
well afford to wait an opportunity, and necd not risk thc substantial 
gain of our Entente Cordialc with China by clutching too eagerly at . 
the problematic chanccs of Tibetan markets." 63 In fact, as pointed 
out by the Dire(:tor of Statistics, the British Commercial intercourse 
with Tibet upto 1900-01 was "still of the slightest." 64 Alastair 
Lamb also has surmised that' 'the figures of trade betwcen India and 1'ibct 
hefore 1192 were no higher than those for latter part of the 19th cen-
tury"65. The opening of the Jelcp pass route in 1819 and the railway to 
Darjeeling in 1881 did not yield any spectaculax result. 66 He has 
also demonstrated that the value of Tibetan trade was' 'not much higher" 
than that of the trade between Bengal and Bhutan. It pales into insigni-
ficance when compared with that for trade with Nepal. 67 "The trade 
of Bengal with Nepal was between 20 and 2 5 times as great as that with 
Tihet." 68 It is true that from the standpoint of the British Government 
the potentiality of the Sikkim route was m<:.gnified and that of Nepd 
route was minimised. But, strangely enough, the Nepal routc hc>d it 
decisively prominent role in the ebb and flow of the Central Asian trade. 
,Though cctual figures arc lacking, Lamb underlines the fact that" ..... 
Probably much more trade between India and Tibet went by Nepal than 
by any other route .......... "69 . . 
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